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Institution of Politically Motivated Policy Certainty of Government on 
 
             Economic growth: A study among Major Indian States 
 
 
 
Abstract:[This paper theoretically tries to explore the  impact of politically motivated 
policy certainty of a government guided by the norm of equality of income on economic 
growth and also tries to examine its empirical validity on major Indian states. This paper 
lends credence to the fact that politically motivated policy uncertainty among most of the 
major Indian states under this study has positive impact on their economic growth. This 
study suggests that the policy of attaining inclusive growth for Indian states should be 
formalized in such a way that equality in income distribution and economic growth should 
be attained simultaneously.] 
       Why do certain countries grow faster than others? Some social scientists 
(Feng;2003,1997;Alesina et al ,1996; Chen and Feng, 1996; Chen and Feng,1999) argue 
that political institutions – political freedom ,political stability, policy certainty  play a 
significant role in the growth trajectory of a nation . How do these political institutions 
lead to economic performance or economic growth? It is argued that individual’s 
economic decisions are rationally conditioned by his assessment of the political 
environments for the marketplace. In particular, economic growth which is a function of 
reproducible capital, will increase or decrease as a function of three political variables: 
political freedom, political stability and policy certainty. They constitute the political 
foundations of economic management and effect not only on economic growth, but also 
on the economic determinants of growth, such as inflation, investment, human capital, 
income inequality, property rights and population growth. Both the direct and indirect 
effects on economic growth of the political variables are important. 
         Political freedom or democracy has been both lauded as a vehicle for happiness and 
prosperity which leads to capital formulation and long run growth of nations. Rather than 
directly on growth, the impact of political freedom tends to be indirect through the 
variables that effect economic growth. 
         On the other hand political stability conceptualizes the probability that the current 
political regime remains in place for the subsequent period. The concept of government 
change or regime change may be due to coup d’etat, which is defined as the ‘extra 
constitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and the effective control of 
the nation’s power structure’ (Banks, 1979; 17, Chen, 2003:51).It defines the probability 
function of extra constitutional government change as a continuous variable, 
characterized as a response to economic and political conditions. The growth slows down 
when the probability of such irregular government change is high. 
         Policy certainty is defined as the absence or lack of disagreement over public policy 
between the governments and its opponents. The opposite concept is policy polarization 
which means change from current social policy or deviation from the current level of 
repression by a new government in future. There may be a high level of political 
instability, as represented by the frequency of government change, but as long as the 
existing policy is preserved in future, the negative effect of political instability on 
economic growth can be significantly offset. If the future government is perceived to be 
very different from the current government in its policy – thus implying a high level of 
uncertainty caused by a potential large policy shift from the current government – the 
investors will prefer liquidizing or consuming today, rather than making a commitment to 
long term investment. If policy certainty is high, then investors will be comfortable in 
making long term investment decisions, everything else being constant. 
          Wealth disparity is a weak foundation for policy consensus, making it difficult for a 
government to adopt consistent policy for long run growth. The weak foundation for policy 
consensus under wealth disparity or inequality in the distribution of income may be 
harmful for human capital accumulation which might impede economic growth. (Castello –
Climant and Domench ,2008).A country or state with relatively high policy certainty is 
usually able to pursue  long run, consistent growth- enhancing economic policies due to 
broadly based support. Empirically it has been found that policy uncertainty is a major 
defining character of economic growth.(Chen and Feng,1999;Chen ,2003.).   
         There are usually two types of measurements of policy certainty :economic policy 
certainty (Grier and Tullock ,1989;Aizerman and Marion ,1993;Brunetti and Weder,1998) 
and politically motivated policy certainty (Chen ,2003;Chen and Feng ,1993a; Chen and 
Feng 1993b;Bueno De Mesquita and Root,2000; Bueno De Mesquita et al,2003).Important 
economic policy certainty variables are standard deviation of inflation, variates of GDP 
,government consumption expenditure in GDP, development expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP, per capita development expenditure ,social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
per capita social expenditure.(Feng ,2003:58).  
       Why are the income distribution variables the major factor of politically motivated 
policy certainty of a government?  The income distribution variables are regarded as the 
most important politically motivated policy certainty variables expanded by Chen and 
Feng, 1996; Chen 2003; Chen and Feng, 1999; Alesina and Dodrick, 1994; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1993. Chen and Feng (1999) strongly remarks that social, political 
and economic conflict in a country often results from income distribution which is perhaps 
the single most important policy variable. In the theory of politics, the government provides 
a public good that benefits everyone. The government competes with the opposition by 
forming a winning coalition in the electorates. The size of the government coalition reflects 
how different the government is from the preference of the citizen at large. The relevancy 
of the model to the measurement of policy certainty through equality is that of income or 
wealth distribution is relatively equal, then the coalition sought by the government and its 
opposition must be large. Consequently, both parties will converge towards the interests of 
the large group of population, producing an outcome that reinforces policy cloning between 
the two opposite parties. 
 
          More importantly, economists, assuming democratic processes in which median 
voter determines the tax rate, choose to bare their models on the political mechanisms of 
income distribution and growth (Alesina and Rodrick, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; 
Perotti, 1993). The median voter determines a tax rate and a balanced budget and thus 
effects economic growth through public sectors input in the marketplace. In this process, 
the political mechanism and the economic structure are integrated if the mean income is 
above the median income; a voter majority emerges proposing a redistribution of income 
from the rich to the poor. The greater the inequality of wealth and income ,the higher the 
tax rate- inequality tends to be positively associated  with the level of tax rate and 
redistribution .According to the  median-voter theorem ,the less the median voter is 
endowed with capital ,the higher the tax rate and the lower the growth rate. As the model 
specifies that the redistribution of income is monotonically and negatively related to 
growth, income inequality is predicted to have an adverse impact on the subsequent growth 
rate. 
 
         How is income distribution measured? There are usually 4 measures of income 
distribution: Gini Coefficient (Muller,1988),Middle income share(Perotti,1996);ratio of 
income (Bollen and Jackman,1985) and Upper income quartile (Muller,1988).But out of all 
measures of income distribution as an index of policy certainty by the theory of politics 
,Gini coefficient is an important measures of income distribution(Chen,2003;Chen and 
Feng ,1999). The larger the variable ,the stronger the degree of political uncertainty. 
 
Why is policy certainty the major defining factor of economic growth among Indian 
states ?  Among the three political variables, political freedom and political stability are 
not as important as policy certainty in the context of comparison among different states 
of India, because political freedom or democracy persists in all the Indian states and the 
political instability, which conceptualizes the government change or regime change due 
to coup d’etat or the extra constitutional   or forced change, does not exists among 
Indian states. 
         Why is politically motivated policy certainty the major factor of a government 
among major Indian states? India has a population of over one billion with a rich 
diversity of religious, linguistic and caste identities and federal system with 28 states 
and 7 union territories. Within this federal system, India possesses high potentiality for 
case variation analysis with the issue of political variables affecting economic growth.  
More importantly, India ranks 66 out of 88 developing countries on the global hunger 
index. It trails sub Saharan countries like Cameroon and Sudan ,where the per capita 
income is much lower than in India. Clearly, India’s impressive growth has not 
translated into eradicating hunger, and the state needs to take concerted, urgent steps to 
secure the right to food for its citizens. In this perspective politically motivated policy 
certainty seems to be the most important factor  of a government affecting economic 
growth among Indian states.  
           This paper, thus, theoretically tries to explore   the impact of politically motivated 
policy certainty of a government guided by the norm of equality of income on economic 
growth and tries to examine its empirical validity on major Indian states.  
      This paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines the simple theoretical model. 
Empirical works appear in section III. Section III has two parts: variables and 
methodology, and results of the empirical findings.    Section IV concludes. 
                                                Section II  
       In the simple theoretical model we try to incorporate political factor into endogenous 
growth and drives the effect of political repression, political stability and policy certainty 
on long run economic growth .But in the empirical model we try to show how does 
policy certainty /uncertainty, a major dimensions of the political system, act as an 
important determinants of economic growth in the context of some major states of India, 
including West Bengal. 
     The following hypotheses are made in the theoretical model.  
1) Economic growth increases as political freedom increases. 
2) Economic growth decreases as political instability increases. 
3) Economic growth decreases as political uncertainty increases.   
    
   The fundamental assumptions of the theoretical model are as follows: 
1) The model considers an economy without population growth. 
2) Utility function is strictly increasing and quasi-concave characterized by diminishing                
marginal utility in consumption. 
3) Individuals taste does not change over time. In that case, the trade-off a consumer 
would be willing to make, with regard to present/young (t-1) versus future consumption 
/old (t) should not depend on date (i.e.  the time identifier),but on the levels of 
consumption in each time period. 
4) Individuals do have same preference for the two periods (no impatience), i.e. a given 
level of income will generate same utility if it is consumed in the future rather in the 
present. 
5) When political freedom is considered we assume that current regime(government) will 
not change in the same period(t). 
6) For political instability, we assume that current regime (government) will be replaced 
at time t. 
7) As to policy certainty is concerned , the policy of the new political regime is assumed 
untested, and once the new regime is installed at time t ,it is equally likely to be either 
more or less repressive than the current regime. 
8) Basic individual skill and exogenous rate of the accumulation of the reproducible 
capital are constants for both the periods. 
 
    We can express impatience by assuming a representative individual born in period t-1 
maximizes the following intertemporal or time-separable utility function. 
 
  V(c t-1, d t) =       u(c t-1) + 1/1+ρ   Et u(dt)    ,  ρ≥0…………(1) 
 
    In (1) c is individual’s consumption when young, d is the individuals consumption 
when old, t is the time-period, ρ is the measure of time preference and e is the expectation 
operator. It is apparent from the utility function that consumption in the future is given 
less weight than consumption now .For the same preference, ρ=o; then the ICs have 
slope=  -1, along the 45 ray. 
   The utility function is additively (strongly) separable in ct-1 and dt, 
For the simplicity of calculation, the intertemporal utility function is assumed to have 
constant elasticity. 
  u(c t-1)  =  1/1-σ( c t-1  ) 
1-σ 
       and     u(dt)  =  1/1-σ  dt 
1-σ 
     ……..(2)     
And elasticity of  intertemporal substitution is σ .Here 0<σ<1. 
    Moreover the separable parts are functionally identical. Both are well behaved (strictly 
increasing and quasi-concave characterized by diminishing marginal utility in 
consumption).   
   The budget constraint when the individual is young is 
   Ct-1     +  kt      =  yt-1          ……………..(3)   
        Where yt-1 is the individual’s income when young and  kt is the accumulation of 
reproducible capital ,including human capital (composite of physical and human 
capital).When old (i.e. at time t)Obviously, income levels determine the amount of 
consumption and investment in the model. 
      One important innovation of the theory of reproducible capital is how an individual 
allocates the time over various activities in the current period and that affects his 
productivity in the future period.(Arrow,1962;Romer,1986;Lucas,1988). 
   Since k is the composite of  physical and human capital ,it creates a knowledge spill-
over on the basic skills of the new generation. 
      Wt-1 kt-1   = yt-1    ………..(4) 
     
     Where w is an exogenous endowment of ‘basic skills’. It measures personal 
productivity in utilizing the total capital accumulated , as wage-earning potential varies 
from person to person with the same level of reproducible capital in the economy.  Since 
k is the average accumulation of reproducible capital in the economy, equation (4) 
implies that the reproducible capital accumulated by previous generation is a positive 
externality on the income of the new generation. The higher the average capital 
accumulated, the higher is the income for the new generation with the endowment of the 
basic skills kept constant. 
   In our economic model of consumption and investment, a person decides how much to 
consume currently and invest for consumption in the future  ,conditioned by his income 
,while how much he earns depends on his idiosyncratic capacity and his existing 
reproducible capital. 
   Importantly, any economy functions within some sort of political framework, and 
consequently, it would be impossible for an economic agent to be uninfluenced to the 
political structure surrounding the economy. 
  How does the accumulation of reproducible capital work as a function of three political 
variables- political freedom, political stability and policy certainty? 
 
 Political freedom: 
   We start with a political regime that exists during the first period of the economic 
agent’s life .If this regime remains in power in the second period  with a probability of  
Π, the budget constraint of the individual when old is, 
 
         dt   = Π rt (1-γ )kt  ,      γ<1………(5) 
 
rt  is   the exogenous rate of return .The variable γ  indicates the political and social costs 
imposed by the government. It is the cost  in the future period about which the individual 
is concerned when he makes an investment decision, given the political constraints. γ can 
take positive or negative sign. When government policy has a positive effect on the 
incentive of the economic agent to invest, which will augment of investment return to the 
individual, γ will take a negative value when exogenous rate  r is kept constant. When 
government policy takes a toll on the economic activities, γ takes a positive value 
between zero and one. Hence the unit of γ lies between- ∞ and 1.[ γ = (- ∞ ,1)]. 
 
 Government may be conducive to the market by establishing rules that protect growth 
enhancing activities.  For instance, the government may pass laws and take actions to 
protect property rights .The government may also provide public goods ,such as national 
defence ,communication network ,transportation infrastructures, research and education  
all of which lead to increase private investment. 
  When government policy takes toll on the economic activities , γ takes a positive value 
.As a result ,total return of the individual will decrease ,compared to the benchmark of no 
government, which is d1  = r1k1,  (γ=0). 
 The variable γ reflects the fundamental characteristics of a political system. The reverse 
of which is political freedom, one of the 3 political variables of a political system. 
 
Political stability: 
The variable Π stands for political stability; as it conceptualizes the probability of the 
current political regime remains in place for the second period, i.e. at period t. So the 
probability that the current regime will be replaced at period t must be 1- Π .Each 
political regime is identified with a particular set of policies, and that those policies do 
not change fundamentally. If the current government can maintain its rule in the future, 
then we can expect policy continuation. The variable Π captures the longevity of the 
current government .It is another name for political stability in our analysis. The reverse 
of which is political instability, i.e. if the policies do undergo a radical change, that is 
equivalent to political regime change and 1- Π captures the probability that the current 
regime will be replaced.(one example is the policy change from Mao’s cultural revolution 
to Deng’s economic reform, where both periods were under the regime of communist 
party of China, they were guided by different political and policy agendas. Therefore, the 
political regime changed for the two historical periods. 
Policy certainty: 
   ∆ γ measures the difference in political and social cost imposed by the new and old 
regimes. When ∆γ equals zero, it is called policy certainty, i.e.there will not be any policy 
difference between the current and future political regimes. The reverse of which is 
policy uncertainty. It is assumed that the policy of the new political regime is contested, 
and once the new regime is installed (i.e. the probability that the current regime will be 
replaced at time t, is 1-Π), there is a probability of 50% that the new regime will be either 
more or less repressive than the current regime by  ∆γ. Here ∆γ gives the third political 
variable. 
  Thus the budget constraint of the old generation, when a new political regime is 
installed is : 
  dt  =  {r1 (1- γ +∆γ)kt}(1- Π)/2 , ,….(6)[ when the current regime is less repressive] 
  dt  =  {r1 (1- γ - ∆γ)kt}(1- Π)/2  , …..(7)[ when the current regime is more repressive] 
     when the three political variables in place , political freedom, political stability and 
policy certainty the individuals problem is to maximize  equation (1) subject to the 
constraints (2) to (7).i.e. 
 
  Max   u(c t-1) + 1/1+ρ   Et{ u(dt)  }  …….(8) 
   Ct-1,dt 
  Setting the marginal utility from consumption in t-1 equal to the marginal utility from 
consumption  
  in t , 
 
( Ct-1) 
-σ
   = 1/1+ρ[ Π(rt(1- γ)) 
1-σ
  + (1- Π)/2 {(rt  (1- γ+ ∆γ)}
 1-σ
  +   {rt  (1- γ+ ∆γ)}
 1-σ
  ]kt
-
σ
  ……….(9) 
 
 Dividing both sides of (9) by kt
-σ
   and substituting wt-1kt-1 -kt for Ct-1, 
 
(kt/ (wt-1kt-1 -kt))
 σ
  =(1+ ρ)-1 { Π(1- γ) 1-σ   + ( 1- Π)/2{(1- γ+ ∆γ)} 1-σ  +   (1- γ-∆γ)} 1-σ  } 
rt
1-σ
   
Defining  g = kt/kt-1 and denoting  
β(Π,γ, ∆γ)=   Π(1-γ) 1-σ   +(1-Π)/2{(1- γ+∆ γ)} 1-σ  +   (1- γ-∆ γ) 1-σ  }……(11)  
 
 We have, g= wt-1  (1+(1+ ρ)
1/σ 
rt  
1-1/ σ
 β-1/σ)-1 ……….(12) 
Evidently, β and g are monotonically increasing or decreasing. 
Lemmas: (1) δβ/δΠ     >0,(2) δβ/δ∆γ <0,  (3)  δβ/δγ <0. 
 
 (1)   δβ/δΠ     =  (1-γ) 1-σ   -1/2 {(1- γ+∆ γ) 1-σ  +   (1- γ-∆ γ) 1-σ  }>0  
 Since (1-γ) 1-σ    is a concave function of (1- γ), it follows that (1-γ) 1-σ    is larger than the 
average value of (1- γ+∆ γ)} 1-σ  and (1- γ-∆γ)} 1-σ  .So we have δβ/δΠ     >0. 
 
 (2) Take the first derivative of equation (11) with respect to ∆  γ  ,we have , 
δβ/δ∆γ  = {( 1- Π)/2 } (1-σ) {(1- γ+ ∆γ) -σ  +   (1- γ-∆ γ) -σ  }<0……(14) 
 
(3) Taking the first order derivative of equation (11) with respect to  γ, we have , 
   δβ/δγ  = ( σ-1)[Π (1-γ)- σ+ ½{(1-Π) {(1- γ+ ∆γ) -σ  +   (1- γ+∆ γ) -σ  }]<0……(15) 
 Therefore the lemmas yield the following propositions: 
 (1) δβ/δΠ     >0 
(2) δβ/δ∆γ <0,  
 (3)  δβ/δγ <0. 
 It is important to mention that (1),(2) and(3) also satisfy the second order conditions. 
      Therefore we can draw the following theoretical conclusions: ceteris paribus, first, the 
lower the probability of the survival of the current regime or higher the level of political 
instability, the lower the growth rate ; second, the more polarized the policy positions 
between the opposite parties or the higher the degree of policy uncertainty ,the lower the 
growth rate ; third, the more repressive the government or lower the level of political 
freedom ,the lower the growth rate. 
     
                                                    Section III 
  Variables and Methodology  
           We try to find out the effect of the political and socio-economic factors 
(captured by g, gini coefficient) on the economic growth (SGDP) among 15 major 
states of India(Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharastra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, 
and West Bengal) during the post liberalization period (1991-2004) .Economic growth 
is regarded as dependent variable. It is measured by  per capita state gross domestic 
product(SGDP). We regress SGDP on g( gini coefficient, policy variable) and some 
control variables(birth rates, infant mortality rates and primary school enrolment rates) 
on the basis of simple OLS method. 
           Important economic control variables considered in this analysis affecting 
economic growth are the initial level of education, infant mortality rate and the birth 
rates.  Human capital plays a critical role in endogenous growth models, which hold that 
knowledge-driven growth can lead to a increasing rate of return. In Romer’s work, for 
instance, human capital is the major input to research and development; since people 
innovate technologies necessary for continued growth (Romer 1990).Empirical evidence 
has revealed a positive relationship between education and growth. In this study, years 
spent in education are employed as a proxy for the initial stock of human capital.It is 
hypothesized that the initial level of human capital has a positive effect on growth. 
      Birth rates  negatively affect economic growth .Feng, Kugler and Zak  in recent 
works (2001,2002),derive and test a set of conditions linking politics to growth through 
fertility rates. A rapid increase in population decreases human capital and transfers 
resources away from economic growth .Barro (1997) empirically that high fertility rates 
tend to have a negative effect on economic growth, while Przeworski et al. (2000) find 
that population growth pronouncedly reduces economic growth .Crude birth rates (CBR) 
,defined as the number of births per 1000 population, is taken as a measure of population 
increase. Infant mortality rate is also an important factor affecting economic growth. In 
our regression model we assume that both infant mortality rate and birth rate have 
negative effect on growth. As regards policy variable is concerned, economic growth is 
negatively influenced by income inequality or policy inconsistency. 
 
 
  Results  
 
The results of the regression are given in following table. 
 
   
SL. 
NO. 
        STATES RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN 
SGDP AND GINI 
IN PRESENCE 
OF THE 
CONTROL 
VARIABLE 
SIGNIFICANT/ 
INSIGNIFICANT 
(AT 5% LEVEL)
 
DESIRABLE/ 
UNDESIRABLE
 
1 ANDHRA PRADESH  NEGATIVE SIGNIFICANT DESIRABLE
 
2 ASSAM POSITIVE INSIGNIFICANT 
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
3 BIHAR NEGATIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
DESIRABLE
 
4 GUJRT POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
5 HARYANA POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
6 KARNATA NEGATIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
DESIRABLE
 
7 KERALA  POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
8 MADHYA PRADESH POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
9 MAHARASRTA POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
10 ORISSA POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
11 RAJASTHAN POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
12 TAMILNADU POSITIVE INSIGNIFICANT 
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
13 UTTAR PRADESH POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
14 WEST BENGAL POSITIVE SIGNIFICANT
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
15 PUNJAB POSITIVE INSIGNIFICANT 
 
UNDESIRABLE
 
 
 
 
 
From the above results the following conclusions can be drawn. 
 
1.For Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Karnataka there is the significant negative relationship 
between the economic growth (SGDP) and the extent of income inequality /policy 
uncertainty (gini coefficient).Thus for these states it may be claimed that as income 
inequality decreases, the SGDP  rises which is definitely a desirable solution. 
2.For the states like Gujrat,Haryana,Kerala,Maharastra,Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa,Rajasthan,Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal there is the significant positive 
relationship between the economic growth (SGDP) and the extent of income inequality 
/policy uncertainty (gini coefficient).This means that the SGDP per capita of these states 
increases with the increase in the level of income inequality/policy uncertainty .From the 
point of view of the common mass ,this is not at all a desirable situation as it implies 
accumulation of the wealth in the hand of the rich class and leads to the widening of the 
gap between the poor and the rich. 
3.For some states like Assam ,Punjab and Tamilnadu there is no significant relationship 
between the economic growth (SGDP) and the extent of income inequality /policy 
uncertainty (gini coefficient) at 5% significant level. 
                  Section IV      
 Why is the study significant? This paper, however, lends credence to the fact that 
politically motivated policy uncertainty among most of the major Indian states under 
our study(12 out of 15 states including West Bengal) has negative impact on 
economic growth. Only 3 states( Karnataka, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh)satisfy  some 
expected results as per our hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
  
        As is well known, the trickle down effect implies that the increase in GDP will 
reduce inequality i.e. the redistributive policies of the government will reduce income 
inequality by keeping up growth rate. Is the proposition effective among major Indian 
states? In the context of the above result it may be said that as majority of Indian 
population are poor, the issue of economic growth is important but not at the cost of 
depletion in human development issues. If economic growth is attained at the cost of 
increasing inequality among the individuals of the economy, then the situation is not 
at all viable. Economic growth should always be coupled with uniform wealth 
distribution. If under any situation there occurs any conflict between the economic 
growth and the distribution of income, then the government should construct its 
policy in such a way that this conflict gets resolved. So, the policy of attaining 
inclusive growth for Indian states should be formalized in such a way that equality in 
income distribution and economic growth should be attained simultaneously. 
Redistribution of income by fiscal methods must be ensured so that poverty and 
income inequality might be reduced.  So, the set of established procedures of 
politically motivated policy certainty of government in Indian states should be 
executed in such a way that there must be a balance between economic growth and 
human development in all those states. 
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